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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2795 
 ___________ 
 
 In re:  ABRAHAM NEE NTREH, 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands 
 (Related to D.V.I. Crim. No. 02-cr-00007) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Raymond L. Finch 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
November 4, 2010 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 Abraham Ntreh, proceeding pro se, petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the 
United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands to resentence him in 
accordance with the decision we issued in his direct appeal.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will deny the petition. 
 In 2003, Ntreh, a Ghanian national, was convicted after a jury trial of unlawful 
reentry of a deported alien into the United States and of making false statements to a 
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United States official.  He received a sentence of 14 months in prison.  Ntreh served his 
sentence and was removed to England on December 28, 2004.  In August 2005, we 
affirmed Ntreh‟s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded the matter for 
resentencing in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  United 
States v. Ntreh, C.A. No. 04-2993, 142 Fed. Appx. 106 (3d Cir. 2005) (unpublished 
decision). 
Following our decision on direct appeal, Ntreh filed a motion to dismiss his 
indictment, claiming, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel.  The District 
Court denied the motion and we dismissed Ntreh‟s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  Ntreh 
then moved for a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence.  The District 
Court denied the motion for a new trial and we again dismissed Ntreh‟s appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction.  In our order, we explained that the final judgment rule requires a conviction 
and imposition of sentence before appellate review.  We also noted that, to the extent 
Ntreh‟s filings could be construed as requesting mandamus relief directing the District 
Court to resentence him, such a request was denied because Ntreh could seek such relief 
in District Court.  
On January 28, 2009, Ntreh filed a motion in District Court to expedite his 
resentencing and a sentencing hearing was scheduled.  The District Court granted the 
Government‟s request for a continuance because Ntreh had been removed and the 
Government needed more time to arrange for his parole into the United States with the 
proper authorities.  The Government moved for a second continuance after Immigration 
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and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officials notified the Government that it was not in 
the agency‟s best interest to parole Ntreh for resentencing because Ntreh had illegally 
entered the United States three times.  Through counsel, Ntreh did not oppose the motion 
and the District Court granted another continuance. 
On July 23, 2009, the day of the rescheduled hearing, Ntreh‟s counsel informed 
Ntreh by letter that the re-sentencing did not take place because he was not present and he 
had not waived his appearance.  Counsel told Ntreh that the Government was not 
interested in bringing him to the United States for the hearing, but that he could appear by 
telephone or waive his appearance.  Ntreh refused to waive his appearance at the hearing 
or appear by telephone.  On September 24, 2009, counsel for both parties appeared for a 
rescheduled sentencing hearing and the District Court continued the matter without 
setting a new hearing date.  
Ntreh then filed in District Court a motion to compel compliance with our order on 
direct appeal remanding his case for resentencing.  Ntreh asserted that he needed to be 
resentenced in order to pursue his appeals and that the failure to resentence him violated 
his due process rights.  The Government opposed Ntreh‟s motion, arguing that Congress 
delegated the power to admit aliens to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security and ICE, which had refused the Government‟s request to return Ntreh for 
resentencing. 
The District Court agreed with the Government and concluded that it could not 
supersede the authority of the Department of Homeland Security and its agents by 
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ordering ICE to allow Ntreh to enter the United States for resentencing.  The District 
Court also stated that Ntreh had not asked the court to review ICE‟s decision nor had he 
set forth any basis for finding that ICE acted improperly in denying parole.  Ntreh then 
filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus asking us to direct the District Court to 
resentence him and to require the Government to “employ the procedures necessary to 
make that possible.”  Petition at 11.  Alternatively, Ntreh asserts that we should direct the 
District Court to dismiss his indictment. 
The writ of mandamus has traditionally been used to confine an inferior court to a 
lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when 
it is its duty to do so.  In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations 
omitted).  “The writ is a drastic remedy that is seldom issued and its use is discouraged.”  
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).  A petitioner must show that he has no other 
means to attain the desired relief and that the right to a writ is clear and indisputable.  Id. 
at 141. 
Ntreh has not shown that his right to a writ is clear and indisputable.  Although we 
agree with Ntreh that he has the right to be present at his resentencing hearing,  see Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 43(a); United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 2000), he has not 
shown that the District Court has the authority to compel the Government to return him to 
the United States for resentencing where ICE has refused to allow him into the country.  
Cf.  United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 443 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding U.S. Attorneys 
do not have authority to make promises regarding deportation matters in plea agreements 
5 
 
and reversing a district court order directing the United States to take steps to prevent the 
defendant‟s deportation).  It is also doubtful that the District Court had jurisdiction to 
review ICE‟s discretionary denial of parole.  See Samirah v. O‟Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 
549 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)).  In addition, even if the 
District Court had the power to compel ICE to grant parole, absent a clear abuse of 
discretion by ICE, Ntreh does not satisfy the standard for mandamus relief.  See Allied 
Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (“where a matter is committed to 
discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant‟s right to a result is „clear and indisputable.‟”).  
We further conclude that Ntreh has not shown that mandamus relief is warranted 
because his inability to appeal the denial of his motion for a new trial and motion to 
dismiss his indictment violates his due process rights.  Although Ntreh‟s inability to 
pursue these appeals implicates his right to due process, Ntreh has not established the 
requisite prejudice to establish a due process violation.  See Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 
F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987) (setting forth relevant factors).
1
  Furthermore, this is not a 
case where Ntreh has been unable to challenge his conviction on appeal.  Rather, Ntreh 
has only been unable to pursue an appeal of his motion for a new trial and motion to 
dismiss his indictment, filed after we affirmed his conviction and remanded his case for 
resentencing. 
                                                 
1
 These factors include:  (1) the prevention of oppressive incarceration  
pending appeal; (2) the minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting 
the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted 
person‟s grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in cases of reversal and retrial, might 
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We recognize that it is unclear if and when Ntreh will be resentenced.  However, 
we conclude that, absent a showing of a clear and indisputable right to relief, the 
extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus is not warranted.  Accordingly, we will 
deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. 
                                                                                                                                                             
be impaired.  Id. 
